In “Idealism and Solipsism in Husserl's Cartesian Meditations”, Harrison Hall argues that a correct understanding of Husserl's position discloses that phenomenology is committed to transcendental idealism but not to what he designates as transcendental solipsism. By this he means that the scope of phenomenology is restricted to consciousness and its contents, and it is in that sense and idealism. Other minds are not countered in the flesh then, but only as unities of meaning. But Husserl is not a transcendental solipsist Hall contends, in that he does successfully disclose the possibility of other minds. He accounts for the necessary genesis of the idea, or “existence sense”, of actually existing others. The star added to " transcendental " in " transcendental solipsism " is to distinguish between the case in which one cannot account for the idea of other minds , and the case ( without the star ) where one cannot affirm the existence of another mind outside the confines of transcendental consciousness .
In this respect, Hall's position closely resembles that of another commentator on Husserl's solipsism, Bernard Dauenhauer . In “A Comment on Husserl and Solipsism " , Dauenhauer argues that Husserl's thought does indeed contain the elements for escaping the position that Hall designates transcendental solipsism , although Husserl did not quite manage it . Dauenhauer conducts a Husserlian analysis of the perception of physical objects, and concludes on the basis of this that other minds are a priori possible. For Hall, the idea of others is as it were “confirmed “when the behaviour of others is seen as consistent with the sense of my constitution of the idea of others. For Dauenhauer, " the detection of actual other egos is simply an empirical question ". One need “simply run through “his experience and apply the criteria he has established for deciding what will count as another mind. I have misgivings about whether the matter is quite so simple. There are two main factors which dictate the emergence of a provisional solipsism in Husserl's philosophy.
The first is obviously the epoch, the methodological device which suspends consideration of the validity of existential claims, including such claims as, “There are other minds.” The second is the Cartesian notion that strict objectivity is tied to immanence - that is, propositions are true if the evidence for them is totally present to consciousness. Obviously the epoch precludes Husserl's being a proper metaphysical solipsist. Although the foundational field of phenomenology is that of consciousness and its objects , the methodical suspension of metaphysical assumptions and claims does not permit assertions like : " The transcendental ego is all of reality " ; " The existence of everything else is a function of the existence of the transcendental ego " , etc. So the commentators had reason for supposing that the point at issue was the possibility, only, of other minds.
But on the other hand, my reading of Husserl discloses ample evidence for the possibility of others, without having to resort to such things as an analysis of the perception of physical objects . For example , were one to take concepts like " transcendental ego , " " subjectivity , " " empirical ego , " etc. , and characterize them in terms of both their content and even of their genesis , is clear that they comprehend all possible instantiations . The effect of the phenomenological reduction is to rid the object of analysis of all con tingent factors, to disclose the necessary and sufficient conditions for anything falling under that concept. That I, the very fact that phenomenology is concerned with essences, rather than “existents”, means that it is concerned with possibilities. And the fact that Husserl analyzes ‘subjectivity,’ ‘pure consciousness,’ etc. means that he was trying to delimit the conditions that any entity must satisfy to fall under those concepts. The essential generality of these notions entails that it is not contradictory to suppose that there are other minds.
In “Idealism and Solipsism in Husserl's Cartesian Meditations”, Harrison Hall argues that a correct understanding of Husserl's position discloses that phenomenology is committed to transcendental idealism but not to what he designates as transcendental solipsism. By this he means that the scope of phenomenology is restricted to consciousness and its contents, and it is in that sense and idealism. Other minds are not countered in the flesh then, but only as unities of meaning. But Husserl is not a transcendental solipsist Hall contends, in that he does successfully disclose the possibility of other minds. He accounts for the necessary genesis of the idea, or “existence sense”, of actually existing others. The star added to " transcendental " in " transcendental solipsism " is to distinguish between the case in which one cannot account for the idea of other minds , and the case ( without the star ) where one cannot affirm the existence of another mind outside the confines of transcendental consciousness .
In this respect, Hall's position closely resembles that of another commentator on Husserl's solipsism, Bernard Dauenhauer . In “A Comment on Husserl and Solipsism " , Dauenhauer argues that Husserl's thought does indeed contain the elements for escaping the position that Hall designates transcendental solipsism , although Husserl did not quite manage it . Dauenhauer conducts a Husserlian analysis of the perception of physical objects, and concludes on the basis of this that other minds are a priori possible. For Hall, the idea of others is as it were “confirmed “when the behaviour of others is seen as consistent with the sense of my constitution of the idea of others. For Dauenhauer, " the detection of actual other egos is simply an empirical question ". One need “simply run through “his experience and apply the criteria he has established for deciding what will count as another mind. I have misgivings about whether the matter is quite so simple. There are two main factors which dictate the emergence of a provisional solipsism in Husserl's philosophy.
The first is obviously the epoch, the methodological device which suspends consideration of the validity of existential claims, including such claims as, “There are other minds.” The second is the Cartesian notion that strict objectivity is tied to immanence - that is, propositions are true if the evidence for them is totally present to consciousness. Obviously the epoch precludes Husserl's being a proper metaphysical solipsist. Although the foundational field of phenomenology is that of consciousness and its objects , the methodical suspension of metaphysical assumptions and claims does not permit assertions like : " The transcendental ego is all of reality " ; " The existence of everything else is a function of the existence of the transcendental ego " , etc. So the commentators had reason for supposing that the point at issue was the possibility, only, of other minds.
But on the other hand, my reading of Husserl discloses ample evidence for the possibility of others, without having to resort to such things as an analysis of the perception of physical objects . For example , were one to take concepts like " transcendental ego , " " subjectivity , " " empirical ego , " etc. , and characterize them in terms of both their content and even of their genesis , is clear that they comprehend all possible instantiations . The effect of the phenomenological reduction is to rid the object of analysis of all con tingent factors, to disclose the necessary and sufficient conditions for anything falling under that concept. That I, the very fact that phenomenology is concerned with essences, rather than “existents”, means that it is concerned with possibilities. And the fact that Husserl analyzes ‘subjectivity,’ ‘pure consciousness,’ etc. means that he was trying to delimit the conditions that any entity must satisfy to fall under those concepts. The essential generality of these notions entails that it is not contradictory to suppose that there are other minds.
Reference:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00071773.1977.11006497?journalCode=rbsp20#